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Facts and Meanings: From Word to Myth
David Rozema
University of Nebraska Kerney

Let me begin by tickling your
mind with a comparison of several quotes
from two Cambridge men. Here are two
from the first Cambridge man:
For a large class of cases—
though not for all—in which we
employ the word “meaning” it can
be defined thus: the meaning of a
word is its use in the language.
Think of the tools in a tool-box:
there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a
screwdriver, a ruler, a glue-pot,
glue, nails, and screws. The
functions of words are as diverse as
the functions of these objects. (And
in both cases there are similarities.)
Of course, what confuses us is the
uniform appearance of words when
we hear them spoken or meet them
in script and print. For their
application is not presented to us so
clearly. Especially when we are
doing philosophy!
It is like looking into the cabin of
a locomotive. We see handles all
looking more or less alike.
(Naturally, since they are all
supposed to be handled.) But one is
the handle of a crank which can be
moved continuously (it regulates
the opening of a valve); another is
the handle of a switch, which has
only two effective positions, it is
either off or on; a third is the handle
of a brake-lever, the harder one
pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a

fourth, the handle of a pump: it has
an effect only so long as it is moved
to and fro. (Wittgenstein, 1958,
remarks 43, 11, 12)

The author of these passages is
reminding us, by means of the analogies
with the tools and the handles, that words
have many various uses. A hammer may
be used to pound nails, but it may also be
used to pull them out, or to straighten
them. It may also be used to crush stones,
to tap a die, or to find a beam behind a
wall. It may even serve as a paper-weight.
Similarly with the other tools mentioned.
In addition, each tool is different from the
others in its range of possible uses. With
the handles, the reminder is similar:
though they are all handles, their
functions are various and quite different
from each other.
This author reminds us of these
things because, as he says, “the uniform
appearance of words when we hear them
spoken or meet them in script or print”
can confuse us. Let’s take, for example,
the word “have”—a word as common in
most people’s vocabulary as a hammer is
in most people’s tool-boxes. Compare the
function of the word “have” in the
following sentences: “I have a house and
two cars”; “I have a wife and two
children”; “I have a headache”; “I have an
idea.” Is the word “have” used in the same
way in all of these sentences? Is it used
the same way in any two of them? Clearly
not. Yet, the word itself is the same. If we
2
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took one meaning of the word to be the
only one, and then tried to understand the
other sentences with that meaning the
result would be confusion. But not
necessarily an obvious confusion: it
would be subtle, for we would be
attempting to use the word in one of its
legitimate senses, only it would not be a
sensible use in that particular context.
Here is another example: the
word “event.” Consider the following
sentences: “Upcoming events at the
Performing Arts Center include . . .”;
“Coming to the Inklings conference has
been one of the greatest events of my
life”; “In the event of flooding, seek
shelter in an upper storey”; “Astronomical
events, such as supernovae and the
formation of black holes, are rarely seen
from earth”; “Research on the workings of
the brain is shedding light on mental
events, such as remembering, decisionmaking, and imagining.” Is the use of the
word “event” the same in all of these
cases? The last sentence is particularly
puzzling, for it seems to cross the
boundary of the sensible uses of the word
“event”: that is, it doesn’t quite seem right
to think of memories, decisions, and
imaginings as “events.” But, perhaps, this
unseemly feeling might itself be simply
another “mental event”!
In any event, as the author also
reminds us, what we need in order to
avoid this sort of confusion is a clear
presentation of the application of the
word; we need the word’s “use in the
language”; we need a particular context.
This author has noticed that such
confusion is especially prominent in
doing philosophy, for it is common to find
amongst philosophers a “craving for
generality” or a “contemptuous attitude
toward the particular case.” That is,
rather than looking at the differences
between particular uses of these words,
the tendency is to want to know what
these words mean “in general.”
Now, here are more ticklers from
the second Cambridge man:

As everyone knows, words
constantly take on new meanings.
Since these do not necessarily, nor
even usually, obliterate the old
ones, we should picture this
process not on the analogy of an
insect undergoing metamorphoses
but rather on that of a tree
throwing out new branches, which
themselves throw out subordinate
branches; in fact, as ramification.
The new branches sometimes
overshadow and kill the old ones
but by no means always. … When
we use one word in many different
senses we avail ourselves of the
results of semantic ramification.
[But] we can do this successfully
without being aware of them. …
Each new speaker learns his native
language chiefly by imitation, partly
by those hurried scraps of amateur
lexicography which his elders
produce in answer to the frequent
question, ‘What does that mean?’
He does not at first—how should
he?—distinguish between different
senses of one word and different
words. They all have to be learned
in the same way. … It is this most
important principle that enables
speakers to give half a dozen
different meanings to a single word
with very little danger of confusion.
… What seems to me certain is that
in ordinary language the sense of a
word is governed by the context
and this sense normally excludes all
others from the mind. … It is of
course the insulating power of the
context which enables old senses to
persist, uncontaminated by newer
ones. Thus, train (of a dress) and
train (on the railway), or civil
(courteous) and civil (not military),
or magazine (a store) and magazine
(a periodical) do not interfere with
one another because they are
unlikely to occur in the same
context. They live happily by
3
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keeping out of each other’s way.
(Lewis, 1960, 9-12)

Notice, first of all, the remarkable
similarity of this author’s comments with
those of the first author. Perhaps you do
not find it remarkable. After all, the main
point is obvious. (Perhaps this is why it is
so often overlooked.) But the similarity
goes quite deep. Both authors recognize
the distinctively different uses of the same
word: there need be no drawn or
conscious connection between one use
and the other. This implies that there is
no single “primary” or “literal” sense of a
word: two different uses of the same
word might be as distinctive as two
different words. Thus, as both authors
also recognize, danger lurks when a word
is abstracted from its particular context—
from its uses in ordinary language—and
then investigated for its “meaning.” To do
so would be analogous to looking at the
hammer, setting in the tool-box, and
asking, “Well, what is the function of that
hammer now, when it’s not being used for
anything? What is it doing when it’s not
doing anything?” The danger here is to
suppose that this is a sensible question—
or, in order to avoid confusion myself,
perhaps I should say, to suppose it makes
sense as a question. Such abstracting of
well known words from their use in
particular contexts and then looking for
their “meaning” is the source of many socalled philosophical problems. And the
danger involved in trying to give
“solutions” to such “problems” is the same
as what gives rise to them in the first
place. For, as our second author says,
When a word has several meanings
historical circumstances often make
one of them dominant during a
particular period. The dominant
sense of any word lies uppermost in
our minds. Wherever we meet the
word, our natural impulse will be to
give it that sense. When this
operation results in nonsense, we
see our mistake and try over again.

But if it makes tolerable sense our
tendency is to go merrily on. We are
often deceived. In an old author [or
in another context] the word may
mean something different. I call
such senses dangerous senses,
because they lure us into
misreadings. (Lewis, 1960, 13)

And this reminds me, too, of what our
first author says of such problems:
These are, of course, not empirical
problems; they are solved, rather,
by looking into the workings of our
language, and that in such a way as
to make us recognize those
workings; in despite of an urge to
misunderstand them. The problems
are solved, not by giving new
information, but by arranging what
we have always known. Philosophy
is a battle against the bewitchment
of our intelligence by means of
language. (Wittgenstein, 1958,
remark 109)

And what, then, is the aim of each
of these men in investigating the
meanings of words? Our second author
says that one of his aims is “to facilitate,
as regards certain words, a more accurate
reading of old books.” (Lewis, 1960, 3) It
is fair to suppose that this aim is part of a
larger aim: to facilitate accurate reading
of any or all books, of listening to any or
all stories. Our first author has famously
said that his aim is “to show the fly the
way out of the flybottle.” (Wittgenstein,
1958, remark 309) On the supposition
that any reader of his books is at least
competent enough to know a metaphor
when he or she reads one, we can safely
interpret this remark to mean that his
aim, too, is to help his readers escape
misunderstandings,
misreading,
“nonsense disguised as sense”—that is, to
become good readers and listeners.
Thus, we find our authors aiming
at the same end: not the end of knowing
facts, but, rather, of understanding
4
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meanings. Or, to put it another way, these
men want to save us from the temptation
to take our language to be only
propositional or representational; to
remind us of the multitude of uses we
have for words, sentences, paragraphs,
stories—even entire books—in order to
then understand their use, their meaning,
in each particular case. If there is danger
in falling under the illusion that a word is
being used meaningfully, sensibly, when,
in fact, it is not being so used, then there
is also danger in falling under the illusion
that a sentence or a story is being
meaningfully, sensibly used when the
surroundings that would give it a clear
sense are lacking. The danger is
misunderstanding, missing the meaning.
I would now like to skip around
this Wood between Words to that Pond
called “Myth” and ask: “How, then, are we
to know the meaning of a myth?” Of
course, each myth will have its own
particular meaning, but what can we say
more generally about the way in which
we are to read or hear—or even believe—
myths and mythical stories? As with
words and sentences, these myths can be
rightly understood only in the context of
their use—or, better yet, by looking at
their affects, what they do to us when we
hear them or read them. I think any
sensible person would see straight away
that such stories are not meant as reports
or hypotheses or histories.
In his masterful monograph, An
Experiment in Criticism, C.S. Lewis devotes
an entire chapter to myth. Since his
“experiment” is to distinguish between
literary and unliterary readers rather
than between good and bad literature, he
does not attempt to provide literary or
textual criteria for determining what kind
of story is or isn’t a myth. Rather, he
defines mythical stories (or the mythical
aspects of stories) in terms of what
characteristic effects these stories have
on us. In the earlier chapters of the book,
Lewis argues that a literary reader is one
who opens himself up to whatever piece

of literature he reads so that its artistic
powers might be fully realized. A good
book will show itself to a good reader. But
Lewis says that the power of a myth does
not lie primarily in its artistic excellence
or its literary presentation: “There is,
then, a particular kind of story which has
value in itself—a value independent of its
embodiment in any literary work. The
story of Orpheus strikes, and strikes deep,
of itself; the fact that Virgil and others
have told it in good poetry is irrelevant.
To think about it and be moved by it is not
necessarily to think about those poets or
to be moved by them.” (Lewis, 1961, 41)
Thus, when it comes to myths, the
distinction between “the literary” and
“the unliterary” is not made by reference
to the literary quality of the writing: “The
value of myth is not a specifically literary
value, nor the appreciation of myth a
specifically literary experience.” (Lewis,
1961, 46) Rather, Lewis makes the
distinction between the myth-lover and
the “unliterary” reader of myths in terms
of the kind of response they each have to
reading (or hearing) the myth. Whereas
the latter—the unliterary reader—reacts
to the mythical story as he would to any
narrative, temporally and superficially;
the former—the myth lover—will find the
myth to be permanently, deeply moving.
“He [the myth lover] will be moved by the
myth as long as he lives; they [the
unliterary readers of myths], when the
momentary excitement is over and the
momentary curiosity appeased, will
forget the Event forever. And rightly, for
the sort of event they value has no claims
on the lasting allegiance of the
imagination.” (Lewis, 1961, 47) The
difference, in short, lies in the capacity to
receive what the mythical story has to
offer, regardless of the literary merits of
how it is presented; a certain sensibility
to—and an appreciation for—beings,
places, happenings, ideas and choices
whose importance and worth lies beyond
ourselves and our experience.
5
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Besides the extra-literary nature
of myth, Lewis adds other characteristics
of our response to the mythical: “The
pleasure of myth depends hardly at all on
such usual narrative attractions as
suspense or surprise. Even on first
hearing it is felt to be inevitable”; “Human
sympathy is at a minimum. We do not
project ourselves at all strongly into the
characters. They are like shapes moving
in another world. We feel indeed that the
pattern of their movements has a
profound relevance to our own life, but
we do not imaginatively transport
ourselves into theirs”; “Myth is always, in
one sense of the word, ‘fantastic’. It deals
with impossibles and preternaturals”;
“The experience may be sad or joyful but
it is always grave”; “The experience is not
only grave but awe-inspiring. We feel it to
be numinous. It is as if something of great
importance has been communicated to
us.” (Lewis, 1961, 43-44)
Here, again, Wittgenstein offers us
some
very
helpful
reminders,
complementing what Lewis has to say
about myth. In his Remarks on Frazer’s
‘Golden Bough’, Wittgenstein investigates
the source of Frazer’s—and, in general,
modern
anthopology’s—
misunderstanding of religious stories and
practices, including those elements we
would call mythical. Frazer takes these
myths, and the rituals and ceremonies
that are often tied up with them, as false
accounts of what “really” happens (or
happened) in time and space—
historically or scientifically. In other
words, he takes them as incorrect
explanations, which are also very often
simplistic, primitive and even barbaric.
But, as Wittgenstein writes,
Frazer’s account of the magical and
religious notions of men is
unsatisfactory: it makes these
notions appear as mistakes.

Was Augustine mistaken, then,
when he called on God on every
page of the Confessions?

Well—one might say—if he was not
mistaken, then the Buddhist holyman, or some other, whose religion
expresses quite different notions,
surely was. But none of them was
making a mistake except where he
was putting forward a theory.

Even the idea of trying to explain
the practice—say the killing of the
priest-king—seems
to
me
wrongheaded. All that Frazer does
is to make this practice plausible to
people who think as he does. It is
very queer that all these practices
are finally presented, so to speak, as
stupid actions.
But it never does become plausible
that people do all this out of sheer
stupidity. (Wittgenstein, 1979, 1e)

The mistake actually lies with
those who suppose that the telling of the
myth is like putting forth an hypothesis,
or making a report. Looking at a myth in
this way—which is part of the broader
mistake of supposing that all language is
used simply to make propositions—leads
to a complete misunderstanding of the
myth. The meaning is thereby lost.
Wittgenstein goes on:
I think one reason why the attempt
to find an explanation is wrong is
that we have only to put together in
the right way what we know,
without adding anything, and the
satisfaction we are trying to get
from the explanation comes of
itself.

And here the explanation is not
what satisfied us anyway. When
Frazer begins by telling the story of
the King of the Wood at Nemi, he
does this in a tone which shows
that something strange and terrible
is happening here. And that is the
answer to the question, “why is this
happening?”: because it is terrible.
In other words, what strikes us in
6
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this course of events as terrible,
impressive, horrible, tragic, etc. (or,
in the case of a different story, as
glorious, sublime, beatific, etc.)—
anything
but
trivial
and
insignificant—that is what gave
birth to them.

Put that account of the King of the
Wood at Nemi together with the
phrase “the majesty of death”, and
you see they are one. The life of the
priest-king shows what is meant by
that phrase.
One would like to say [to Frazer]:
This is what took place here; laugh
if you can. (Wittgenstein, 1979, 2e,
3e)

The point is that mythology is
inextricably entwined with our conviction
that our experiences in and of the
universe are significant, meaningful and
transcendent. This is shown by the fact
that, as Wittgenstein says, “A whole
mythology is deposited in our language.”
(Wittgenstein, 1979, 10e)
Lewis gives examples, both older
and newer, of stories that are among the
“great myths”—Orpheus, Demeter and
Persephone, the Hesperides, Balder,
Ragnarok, and Ilmarinen’s forging of the
Sampo—or are mythical in character—
Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,
Wells’s The Door in the Wall, Kafka’s The
Castle, the castle of Gormenghast in
Mervyn Peake’s Titus Groan, and the Ents
and Lothlorien in The Lord of the Rings. I
think we could add to the list many of
Plato’s stories—for example, the tale of
Atlantis, the creation myth in Timeaus;
James Hilton’s Lost Horizon; nearly the
whole of Tolkien’s Silmarillion (think
especially of the Ainulindale, the making
of the Silmarils and Feanor’s great pride
and the oath of doom, the lay of Beren and
Luthien, the tragic tale of Turin Tarambar,
the calling of Tuor, the voyage of Earendil,
the rise and fall of Numenor); and, of
course, many elements in Lewis’s own

fiction: Till We Have Faces; the stories of
Ramandu, the Ruined City, the Wood
between the Worlds, and the dead world
of Charn from The Chronicles of Narnia;
the Caves of Perelandra, and the descent
of the gods in That Hideous Strength.
But what is the intrinsic value of
the mythical? In what does its value
consist, and how is it (or ought it to be)
manifest in our lives? What is the worth
of having and developing such a
sensibility? To answer this, I’d like to cite
a mythical element from the first book of
Lewis’s Space trilogy, Out of the Silent
Planet: Ransom’s realization that space is
full of life, filled with living creatures.
Lewis describes it in two places in the
novel, first during Ransom’s journey to
Malacandra:
But Ransom, as time wore on,
became aware of another and more
spiritual cause for his progressive
lightening and exultation of heart. A
nightmare, long engendered in the
mind by the mythology that follows
in the wake of science, was falling
off him. He had read of ‘Space’: at
the back of his thinking for years
had lurked the dismal fancy of the
black, cold vacuity, the utter
deadness, which was supposed to
separate the worlds. He had not
known how much it had affected
him till now—now that the very
name
‘Space’
seemed
a
blasphemous
libel
for
this
empyrean ocean of radiance in
which they swam. He could not call
it ‘dead’; he felt life pouring into
him from it every moment. How
indeed should it be otherwise, since
out of this ocean the worlds and all
life had come? He had thought it
barren: he saw now that it was the
womb of worlds, whose blazing and
innumerable offspring looked down
nightly even upon the earth with so
many eyes—and here with how
many more! No: space was the
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wrong name. Older thinkers had
been wiser when they named it
simply the heavens—the heavens
which declared the glory—” (Lewis,
1938, 34)

And then again upon his return to earth:
He could not feel that they were an
island of life journeying through an
abyss of death. He felt almost the
opposite—that life was waiting
outside the little iron egg-shell in
which they rode, ready at any
moment to break in, and that, if it
killed them, it would kill them by
excess of its vitality. And if he had
felt some such lift of the heart when
first he passed through the heaven
on their outward journey, he felt it
now tenfold, for now he was
convinced that the abyss was full of
life in the most literal sense, full of
living creatures. (Lewis, 1938, 145)

What does this story do to you?
What is its effect? If we could say that it
was “used” for anything or by anyone at
all, what would you say that use is?
Clearly it is not meant to inform, or to
persuade, or merely to entertain. Neither
is it some call to action nor a cry of
passion. It is not presented as an opinion
or a theory. But it does have the power to
humble us, to inspire awe, to shape our
attitude towards what transcends us, and
to cause our spirits to long for our
consummation in what is inexpressibly
greater than us. That is the meaning of the
myth. And it is a great good, a good in
itself—something we are meant for. This
is why, in the last chapter of Out of the
Silent Planet, Ransom writes to Lewis,
“[W]hat we need now is not so much a
body of belief as a body of people
familiarized with certain ideas. If we
could even effect in one percent of our
readers a change-over from the
conception of Space to the conception of
Heaven, we should have made a
beginning.” (Lewis, 1938, 152)

That is the power of the mythical,
even among—no, especially among—the
the most reasonable people. In this lies its
intrinsic value. And, in one sense, its
truth—for it evokes a right and deep
appreciation for what transcends us.
How much more powerful, then, if
we believe the myth to be also true in the
metaphysical sense—if it is our Credo?
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